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Share structure is an important issue of corporate governance. Thereinto, 
allocation and realization method of shareholders’ voting right is vital for 
protecting the shareholders’ interests and rights and the company’s operation and 
management. In the US, Dual Class share structure is an institutional 
arrangement in order to join corporate governance innovation with shares with 
different voting rights. It represents a higher degree of company autonomy. 
Comparatively, speaking of legislation and practices, China still sticks to the 
traditional “one-share-one-vote” mode, and has no regulation or system allowing 
Dual Class share structure. In this thesis, the author made comparative study, 
empirical analysis and literature research in order to make a thorough research on 
legitimacy and rationality of Dual Class share structure for corporate governance. 
In Part 1, the author explained the connotation of Dual Class share structure and 
compared it with “one-share-one-vote” and the system of preferred shares. 
Moreover, the author analyzed its application circumstances. In Part 2, the author 
discussed the rationality of Dual Class share structure both theoretically and 
practically in light of corporate law theories such as agency theory and enterprise 
contract theory. In Part 3, the author briefly introduced the current situation of 
problems of China’s share structure, and took Alibaba and Baidu as examples to 
elaborate Chinese companies’ practical explorations on new-type share structure. 
In Part 4, the author briefly introduced the state of development of Dual Class 
shares in the US and its supporting mechanism, and took Facebook and Google as 
examples to summarize points China can borrow from the American models. In 
Part 5, with regard to the existing problems of corporate governance in China, the 
author elaborated the necessity of using Dual Class share structure in China. In 
addition, the author gave suggestions on building of the system and the 
applicable boundary of law, and hopes that this thesis can be helpful for 
improving Chinese corporate governance system. 
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① 例如，Facebook（脸书网）在其上市融资前，就已通过股权分置的形式将公司股份分为 A、B 两类，公
司在上市前的股份均为代表一个投票权的 A类股，在上市后自动转化为代表十个投票权的 B 类股，而公司
上市后发行的股份均为 A类股。再如，福特汽车公司也将其股份分为了 A、B 两类，其中 B 类股只能由福
特家族持有。故福特家族只要持有占公司股份 4%左右的 B类股，即可拥有超过 40%的投票权。另外，默
多克集团、Linkedin（领英）公司同样采取类似的双层股权结构。 
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